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Abstract
The macroeconomic literature has found puzzling effects of government spend-
ing on private consumption, the real exchange rate and the terms of trade. Some
authors find that private consumption increases after a shock to government spend-
ing, while others report a decrease. The same ambiguity can be found for the real
exchange rate and the terms of trade. Our paper offers an intuitive explanation for
these divergent results by distinguishing between productive and unproductive gov-
ernment spending. We show within a calibrated two-sector DSGE model that the
two government spending categories have different effects on private consumption,
the real exchange rate and the terms of trade. Hence, our findings suggest that the
composition of government spending matters not only for long-run growth, but also
impacts on the short-run.
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1 Introduction
The severe recession following the financial crisis induced many governments to initiate
large fiscal stimulus programs. These measures heavily relied on increases in government
spending and less on tax reductions. Policymakers particularly advocated the increase of
infrastructure spending in order to stimulate GDP, investment and private consumption.
It is often argued that expenditures on infrastructure have more desirable effects on these
macroeconomic variables than does an increase in ordinary government expenditures.
Does an increase in government spending have different effects on the economy than a
shock to unproductive government spending? Can the distinction we make between these
two spending categories even help to explain the ambiguous empirical results regarding
the effect of fiscal policy on the real exchange rate and the terms of trade? The real
exchange rate compares domestic and foreign output prices, while the terms of trade
does a similar comparison between the prices of domestic and foreign tradable goods.
In the literature, there seems to be a consensus regarding the positive short-run output
effect of government spending, even though there is considerable disagreement on the
size of this impact (for a good overview, see Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz (2002) and
Spilimbergo, Symansky and Schindler (2009)). For other macroeconomic variables such
the real exchange rate, the terms of trade and private consumption, there is no consen-
sus even on the direction of the response of these variables to an increase in government
spending. Associated with these disagreements are important methodological differences
in terms of the estimation strategy.
For the real exchange rate, most empirical papers report a depreciation (e.g. Corsetti,
Meier and Mueller (2009) and Monacelli and Perotti (2009)), which is at odds with the
theoretical predictions of the standard neoclassical model. A few find an appreciation of
the real exchange rate (e.g. Clarida and Prendergast (1999)), which is, however, reversed
in the longer run. The evidence for the terms of trade is also mixed: while Monacelli
and Perotti (2009) report a depreciation, Mueller (2006) finds an appreciation of the
terms of trade. Besides, there is no agreement as to the effects of government spending
on private consumption. A range of empirical studies, e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
and Monacelli and Perotti (2009) report an increase in private consumption, while other
studies find a negative effect (see e.g. Ramey and Shapiro (1999), Edelberg, Eichenbaum
and Fisher (1999) and Ramey (2008)).
Our purpose in this paper is to investigate whether the puzzling empirical findings re-
garding the effects of government spending can be explained by distinguishing between
productive and unproductive government spending. This is done by adding the stock
of public capital to the production function of private firms. We study the effects of
productive government spending in a small open two-sector economy. By distinguishing
between a trading and a non-trading sector, we get useful insights into the different re-
actions of the real exchange rate and the terms of trade.
The general idea behind including productive government spending in the production
function is that public and private inputs are not close substitutes. Examples of pro-
ductivity enhancing government spending include - in a narrow sense - roads, railway
infrastructure and airports. In a broader sense, one could also include spending cate-
gories such as education and health care. In this paper, however, we interpret productive
public capital in a narrow sense to get a conservative idea of its theoretical short-run
effects. An early theoretical contribution to the analysis of public infrastructure in the
context of long-run economic growth stems from Arrow and Kurz (1969). The literature
was further developed by Barro (1990) and Baxter and King (1993). The more recent
literature includes, among others, Linnemann and Schabert (2006) and Leeper, Walker
and Yang (2009), who analyze a closed economy. Empirically, an early influential study
was conducted by Aschauer (1989), who estimated a log-linear production function and
found an elasticity of 0.39 of output to nonmilitary public infrastructure. However, this
high initial estimate of the productivity of public infrastructure was revised downwards
by subsequent research and sometimes even estimated to be 0 (for a survey of the liter-
ature, see Romp and de Haan (2007)). A reasonable range for the elasticity seems to lie
between 0.1 and 0.2.
If one adds the stock of public capital into the production function, what does standard
macroeconomic theory predict will happen in the short-run after a shock to government
investment? First, an increase in government demand for investment goods has the
same effect on demand as a shock to non-productive spending. There is, however, an
additional effect here, namely that government investment increases the productivity of
private firms. This part of the impact of a shock to productive government spending
should thus show similar effects as a technology shock, whose impacts have been studied
extensively in the macroeconomic literature. A shock to productive government spend-
ing is therefore a combination of these two partial effects. While both kind of shocks
can be expected to increase GDP, things are more complicated for private consumption.
Consumption increases after a technology shock, but decreases after a shock to unpro-
ductive government spending. The same ambiguity holds for private investment and the
terms of trade. While a technology shock increases private investment and depreciates
the terms of trade, the opposite holds for the demand shock, as it was discussed for
unproductive government spending.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the
model of a small open economy that is used to simulate the macroeconomic effects of
fiscal policy instruments. This description is followed by section 3, which explains how
the parameter values of the model are chosen. The simulation results of this model are
presented and discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 contains the conclusion.
2 The Model
The model used to analyze the macroeconomic effects of government spending categories
is an extension of a standard DSGE model. The special features of the model in this
paper is that it incorporates a detailed analysis of the government and two sectors of
production. We call the first sector the manufacturing sector that produces tradable
goods. The second sector is called the services sector comprising e.g. the majority of
services, construction work and agriculture. The goods produced in the services sector
are assumed to be non-tradable. Both sectors employ labor and capital, which makes it
possible to study the sector specific behavior of the variables in these two sectors.
2.1 Production
2.1.1 Sector ”M”
In this sector that can be interpreted as the manufacturing sector, the perfectly compet-
itive firms produce output mt according to:
mt = z
m(kgt )
γ (kmt )
α1 (lmt )
1−α1 (1)
Note that a subscript to identify an individual firm is suppressed because all firms are
identical. kmt is capital used in this production sector and l
m
t is labor input. k
g
t is
the stock of public capital, which is assumed to be non-rival. This means that public
infrastructure is equally productive for all firms. α1 and γ determine the elasticity of
output with respect to the input factors. zm stands for total factor productivity. Note
that there are constant returns to scale in the privately provided inputs. One could also
assume constant returns to scale in all three inputs, as it was done by Aschauer (1989)
and Barro (1990). In fact, as pointed out by Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), it makes little
difference to the result what specification is actually chosen, provided that one assumes
Fkl > 0, which is given for the chosen production function.
The solution to the cost minimization problem implies that all intermediate goods firms
equate their capital-labor ratio to a constant determined by α1 times the ratio of nominal
input prices, which are given by wmt for labor and r
m
t for capital.
kmt
lmt
=
1− α1
α1
wmt
rmt
(2)
To keep the basic version of the model as simple as possible, prices are assumed to be
flexible 1. Output prices pmt , which are equal to nominal marginal costs are then given
by:
pmt = mc
m
t =
(rmt )
α1(wmt )
1−α1(1− α1)α1−1α−α11
(kgt )
γ
(3)
From this expression, one can see that an increase in productive public capital has the
same effects on output prices as a technology shock.
2.1.2 Sector ”S”
This sector can be seen as comprising the services and the construction sector. Produc-
tion in this relatively unproductive sector is given by:
st = z
s(kgt )
γ(kst )
α2(lst )
1−α2 (4)
kst is capital and l
s
t is labor used in the inefficient sector. As for the manufacturing sector,
kgt denotes the stock of productive public capital and is again assumed to be non-rival.
α2 and γ determine the elasticity of output with respect to the input factors and z
s
denotes total factor productivity. It is assumed that α1 > α2, which implies that the
services sector is more labor intensive than the manufacturing sector. Cost minimization
implies for nominal output prices and marginal costs:
1In the appendix, a version of the model with sticky prices is discussed.
pst = mc
s
t =
(rst )
α2(wst )
1−α2(1− α2)α2−1α−α22
(kgt )
γ
(5)
In addition, the optimal ratio between capital and labor is given by:
kst
lst
=
1− α2
α2
wst
rst
(6)
2.1.3 Investment
In the preceding sections, we did not discuss the evolution of the capital stock. The
inclusion of two production sectors into the model raises the issue of the composition of
investment expenditures. According to empirical evidence, investment can be seen as a
composite of manufacturing and services goods (see e.g. Bems (2008)). Following this
reasoning, investment in the two sectors can be described by a CES-type function:
imt =
(
a
1
θ1
1 (im
m
t )
θ1−1
θ1 + (1− a1)
1
θ1 (imst )
θ1−1
θ1
) θ1
θ1−1
(7)
ist =
(
a
1
θ2
2 (is
m
t )
θ2−1
θ2 + (1− a2)
1
θ2 (isst )
θ2−1
θ2
) θ2
θ2−1
(8)
imt and ist denote demand for investment goods by the two sectors and a superscript
m or s tells us the demand for goods produced by sector m and s. θ1 and θ2 determine
the elasticities of substitutions between the two inputs. Concerning a1 and a2, we will
assume that investment expenditures in a sector are biased towards goods from its own
sector.
It is straightforward to derive the associated price indexes pimt for imt and p
is
t for ist:
pimt =
(
a1(p
m
t )
1−θ1 + (1− a1)(pst )1−θ1
) 1
1−θ1
pist =
(
a2(p
m
t )
1−θ2 + (1− a2)(pst )1−θ2
) 1
1−θ2
The input demand functions can be written as:
immt = a1
(
pmt
pimt
)−θ1
imt
imst = (1− a1)
(
pst
pimt
)−θ1
imt
ismt = a2
(
pmt
pist
)−θ2
ist
isst = (1− a2)
(
pst
pist
)−θ2
ist
Finally, the evolution of the two capital stocks, which is driven by investment, can be
written as:
kmt+1 = (1− δ)kmt + imt
kst+1 = (1− δ)kst + ist
As usual, the parameter δ is the rate of depreciation, which is assumed to be the same
in both sectors.
2.2 The Representative Individual
The economy in this model is populated by a representative individual, whose utility
function U is given by:
U = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
c1−σt
1− σ −
1
1 + χ
(
φ1(l
m
t )
1+χ + φ2(l
s
t )
1+χ
))
(9)
ct is a consumption aggregate, l
m
t denotes hours worked in the more productive sector
and lst is hours worked in the less productive sector. σ is a parameter that determines
the intertemporal substitution of consumption. χ is a parameter that determines the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and the parameters φ1 and φ2 influence
the disutility of work. This disutility is assumed to be higher for the productive sector,
because work in this sector is supposed to be more stressful.
Given that the representative individual is the owner of the capital stocks described
in the last section, she has to make investment decisions. Besides, the individual holds
one-period government bonds (dt) and pays lump-sum taxes. Following this description,
the budget constraint can be written in nominal terms:
(wmt l
m
t + w
s
t l
s
t ) + r
m
t k
m
t + r
s
tk
s
t =
pctct + p
im
t imt + p
is
t ist
− (1 + rdt−1)dt−1 + dt + tt + (1 + rft−1)ft−1 − ft +
ς
2
(ft − ft−1)2 (10)
pct is the price for the consumption aggregate, i.e. the consumer price index (CPI).
rdt is the nominal return for government bonds. In addition, the individual holds debt
towards the rest of the world (ft) and pays an interest rate r
f
t on this debt. The term
ς
2(ft − ft−1)2 stands for adjustment costs that a consumer has to pay when he changes
his holdings of foreign debt. These costs are small and are solely included to make
the model stationary (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003)). The evolution of ft is
given by ft = −tbt + (1 + rft−1)ft−1, where tbt is the nominal trade balance given by:
tbt = p
m
t ext − pimpt cimpt . In steady-state, exports equal imports for each category of
goods, which implies that the trade balance is zero. Exports are modeled in a way such
that a one-percent increase in domestic prices leads to a one-percent decrease in exports.
Note further that this paper considers a cashless economy and, therefore, consumers hold
no money. The first-order conditions for the individual are given by:
c−σt
pimt
pct
=
βc−σt+1
(
(1− δ)p
im
t+1
pct+1
+
rmt+1
pct+1
)
(11)
c−σt
(
pist
)
pct
=
βc−σt+1
(
(1− δ)p
is
t+1
pct+1
+
rst+1
pct+1
)
(12)
c−σt
pct
= β
c−σt+1
pct+1
(
1 + rdt+1
)
(13)
ψ1p
c
t(l
m
t )
χ = wmt c
−σ
t (14)
ψ2p
c
t(l
s
t )
χ = wst c
−σ
t (15)
The consumption aggregate ct consists of tradable manufacturing goods c
tr
t and services
cst :
ct =
(
a
1
θ3
3 (c
tr
t )
θ3−1
θ3 + (1− a3)
1
θ3 (cst )
θ3−1
θ3
) θ3
θ3−1
(16)
a3 is a weighting parameter that influences the expenditure shares of private consumption
that go to the two sectors and θ3 determines the elasticity of substitution between the
two types of consumption. The associated demand functions are:
ctrt = a3
(
ptrt
pct
)−θ3
ct
cst = (1− a3)
(
pst
pct
)−θ3
ct
The consumer price index (CPI) for the consumption aggregate is given by:
pct =
(
a3(p
tr
t )
1−θ3 + (1− a3)(pst )1−θ3
) 1
1−θ3
Within the category of tradables (ctrt ), the individual can choose between consuming
domestically produced final manufactured goods (cmt ) and an equivalent imported final
good (cimpt ):
cmt = a4
(
pmt
ptrt
)−θ4
ctrt (17)
cimpt = (1− a4)
(
pimpt
pct
)−θ4
ct (18)
The associated price index for tradable consumer goods is given by:
ptrt =
(
(1− a4)(pimpt )1−θ4 + a4(pmt )1−θ4
) 1
1−θ4 (19)
2.3 The Government
In this section, fiscal policy is studied in a detailed manner and takes more space than
in other papers. We assume that the government collects lump-sum taxes that are
used to finance productive government spending (igt), and to pay the government’s non-
productive expenditures (gt), which includes payments to government employees and
the consumption of goods and services. Thus, the government has the following budget
constraint in nominal terms:
dt + tt = p
s
t igt + p
s
tgt + (1 + r
d
t−1)dt−1
It is assumed that the government buys its goods and services from the private sector.
This incorporates the assumption that the production function of the government is the
same as the production function of the private sector. More specifically, it is assumed
that the government buys its goods from sector S. Given that sector S is meant to com-
prise services and construction work, this assumption can be seen as reasonable.
Since our objective is to study the effects of productive and unproductive government
spending, two separate policy rules for these two spending instruments are set up. For-
mally, the rules for real productive and unproductive government spending are assumed
to be given by:
pst igt
pct
=
(
pst−1igt−1
pct−1
)q1 (psssigss
pcss
)1−q1
e3 (20)
pstgt
pct
=
(
pst−1gt−1
pct−1
)q2 (psssgss
pcss
)1−q2
e4 (21)
where qi are parameters that measure the elasticity of the left-hand side variable with
respect to the right-hand side variable. The subscript ss denotes steady-state values and
i are shocks to the two government spending categories.
In this model, government expenditures are initially financed by public debt. To ensure
that the model eventually returns to its steady-state, it is usually necessary that a fiscal
variable reacts to the debt-to-GDP ratio (see e.g. Leeper et al. (2009)), where real
GDP is given by gdpt =
pmt mt+p
s
tst
pct
. In our model, lump-sum taxes react to the debt-to-
GDP ratio. This leads to a rule for real taxes similar to the one for the two spending
categories without the shock term, but augmented with a term that reflects the reaction
to the debt-to-GDP ratio:
tt
pct
=
(
tt−1
pct−1
)q3 ( tss
pcss
)1−q3 (dt−1/pctgdpt−1
dss/pcssgdpss
)q4
(22)
These government spending rules should not be interpreted as institutional rules re-
stricting the government. Instead, one should see them as a description of fiscal policy
(decided by a government that takes the evolution of public debt into account). Alterna-
tively, one could assume that fiscal policy instruments relative to GDP are the variables
of interest. However, at least in the short-run, it is unlikely that policy-makers target
ratios of fiscal variables to GDP. Finally, the evolution of public capital is given by2:
kgt+1 = igt + (1− δ)kgt (23)
Note that the rate of depreciation for public capital is assumed to be the same as for the
private sector.
2.4 Resource Constraints
To close the model, the resource constraints need to be satisfied.
st = c
s
t + im
s
t + is
s
t + igt + gt (24)
mt = c
m
t + ex
m
t + im
m
t + is
m
t (25)
3 Choice of Parameter Values
The chosen parameter values of the model are listed in Table 1. As it is common in
the literature, one period in the model corresponds to one quarter. Most parameters
lie in the range of most papers in the DSGE literature on fiscal policy. The discount
factor is set to 0.99. The coefficients that determine the intertemporal substitution of
consumption and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply are both equal to 1.
Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Parameter Value
β 0.99 q2 0.85
σ 1 q3 0.85
δ 0.025 q4 0.02
χ 1 a1 0.6
φ1 3 a2 0.4
φ2 2 a3 0.4
α1 0.4 a4 0.4
α2 0.3 θ1 1
γ 0.1/0.2 θ2 1
ς 0.01 θ3 1
q1 0.85 θ4 1
α1 is assumed to be bigger than α2, which implies that the share of capital in the man-
ufacturing sector is bigger than in the services sector. We experiment with two values
2In the appendix, the effects of longer implementation delays are discussed
of γ, 0.1 and 0.2, which implies that a one percent increase in kgt rises output by 0.1%
resp. 0.2%. As has been discussed in section 1, these values correspond to a reasonable
lower and upper bound of the empirical findings in the long-run growth literature. The
parameters that determine the elasticities of substitution between consumption aggre-
gates are set to 1, which implies that a constant share of a spending aggregate goes to
the respective spending category. a1, a2, a3 and a4 are all chosen in a way to reflect
the assumed biases discussed in section 2. In steady-state, the price of manufacturing
output relative to the price of services is assumed to be equal to 1.
We calibrate fiscal policy in a similar way as in Davig and Leeper (2009). The size of
government (excluding transfers), measured as the ratio of total expenditures to GDP
is set to approximately 0.20. The steady-state ratio of productive government spending
to GDP is roughly 0.04, and for non-productive government spending 0.15. Lump-sum
taxes are chosen in a way such that the debt-to-(quarterly)GDP ratio is near 2.4. Since
the variables are calibrated at a quarterly frequency, this implies a debt-to(-annual)-
GDP ratio of roughly 0.6. This corresponds roughly to the average debt-to-GDP ratio
for OECD countries before the financial crisis. The values of the parameters q1 and q2
are inspired by Corsetti et al. (2009) and both set to 0.85. As discussed in section 2, the
parameter ς determines the adjustment costs of foreign debt.
4 Simulation Results
In this subsection, we present impulse response functions for shocks to productive (reig)
and unproductive (reg) government spending.3 We focus on the variables real GDP
(gdp), real consumption (cons), real wages in the manufacturing (wage m) and the ser-
vices (wage s) sector, the real interest rates in both these sectors (int m and int s),the
relative price of manufacturing output relative to services (pm ps), the real exchange rate
(rex) and the terms of trade (tot) 4.
4.1 Shock to Unproductive Government Spending
This section looks at the behavior of the model after a shock to unproductive govern-
ment spending. As one can see in figure 1, the reaction of the variables corresponds
to the theoretical predictions of a standard macroeconomic model. There is a positive
effect on GDP, which, however, disappears within roughly ten periods. As expected, the
consumption aggregate decreases. Given that unproductive government spending goes
3For all simulations, the Dynare software version 4.1.0 is used.
4Formally, the real exchange rate is defined as rext = (p
c
t)
∗/pct and tott = (p
m
t )
∗/pmt
to the services sector, it is not surprising that real wages in this relatively unproductive
sector increase, while real wages in the productive sector decrease. The same develop-
ment can be observed for the real interest rates in the two sectors.
Concerning the real interest rate and the terms of trade, one can see that the real
exchange rate appreciates because domestic output prices increase including the prices
for tradables. The terms of trade initially depreciate before they appreciate. Why is
this the case? This is due to the fact that higher unproductive government spending
increases prices in the non-tradable sector, which therefore leads to a substitution of
private consumption and investment towards the tradable good.
Figure 1: Shock to Unproductive Government Spending
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4.2 Shock to Productive Government Spending
The impulse response functions for a shock to productive government spending (figure
2) confirm the theoretical reasoning applied in section 1, namely that this shock can be
seen as a combination of a technology shock and a nonproductive government spending
shock. There is a persistent increase in GDP due to the productivity-enhancing effect of
productive government spending. Consumption initially decreases, but becomes positive
as soon as the productivity-enhancing part of the shock dominates the pure government
demand shock. Real wages and interest rates show a divergent pattern in the short-run
due to the demand side effect of government spending. After some periods, however,
the increase in productivity dominates and leads to an increase in real income for factor
inputs in both sectors. Compared with a shock to unproductive spending, it is in partic-
ular the real wage in the services sector, whose evolution changes and remains above its
steady-state level. One can observe that the response of private consumption becomes
positive roughly at the same time as the response of real wages in both sectors turns
positive. Real interest rates show a pattern similar to that of real wages.
The real exchange rate appreciates in the short-run because increased government de-
mand leads to a rise in the consumer price index. As soon as the productivity-enhancing
effect dominates, the real exchange rate depreciates. The terms of trade, however, in-
crease (i.e. depreciate) immediately because of the assumption that government demand
goes to the non-tradable sector, while increasing productivity in both the tradable and
nontradable sector.
Figure 2: Shock to Productive Government Spending when γ = 0.1
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If one does the same exercise using a value of γ = 0.2, the observed effects can be expected
to become more pronounced. Indeed, this is what can be seen from the impulse responses
in figure 3. Interestingly, the responses of private consumption and the real exchange
rate are now already positive in the first periods.
Figure 3: Shock to Productive Government Spending when γ = 0.2
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have compared the short-run effects of productive and unproductive
government spending on private consumption, the real exchange rate and the terms of
trade. The simulation results show that the distinction between these two spending
categories can contribute to explain why the empirical literature has found divergent
impacts of government spending on these two macroeconomic variables.
The distinction between productive and unproductive government spending is some-
how artificial and it is often difficult to make in practise. Furthermore, policymakers
may be incited to declare a stimulus package as productivity enhancing when in reality,
it is not. While the model in this paper has contributed to the theoretical basis to judge
the potential impact of productive government spending, the practical relevance of these
findings need to be examined by future research.
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A Implementation Delays
This section of the appendix considers the effects of implementation delays associated
with building public capital. This modification tries to take into account that the pro-
vision of productive government spending may take more than one period (as in e.g.
Leeper et al. (2009)). Thus, we vary n in the equation
kgt+1 = igt−n + (1− δ)kgt .
Figure 4 shows how implementation delays affect the impulse responses for our economy.
We consider three cases to illustrate the effects of varying n: n = 0 as in the main part
of this paper (solid lines), n = 2 (dashed lines) and n = 4 (dotted lines). The impulse
response functions for the first 15 periods after the shock are depicted.
One can see that the qualitative pattern of most of the impulse response functions
does not change. If there are implementation delays, the response of GDP is first very
similar to the response for a shock to unproductive government spending. Due to this
reason, the response of GDP even becomes negative after some periods when there are
implementation delays. One can further observe that the effects on the terms of trade
and the real exchange rate are only slightly modified.
Figure 4: Shock to Productive Government Spending with Implementation Delays: n = 0
(solid lines), n = 2 (dashed lines) and n = 4 (dotted lines)
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B Announcement Shocks
While implementation delays in a technological sense were analyzed in the last section,
this section looks at implementation delays associated with the political and administra-
tive process. What is meant by this is the period of time between the announcement of
a project and its actual starting point. Thus, public investment igt at period t is deter-
mined by the announcement jt−n of future investment by the government at period t−n.
We thus have igt = jt−n, which shows that we do not consider uncertainty about the
completion of a project due to the political process. As in the last section, we consider
three cases to illustrate the impacts of varying n: n = 0 (solid lines), n = 2 (dashed
lines) and n = 4 (dotted lines).
One can observe in figure 5 that the response of GDP already differs in the first period,
where the unexpected government demand shock immediately stimulates the economy
for the case n = 0. Pure announcement shocks make individuals smooth their consump-
tion. In the case of a delay between the announcement of a project and its provision,
consumption falls less initially, but then increases less for the rest of the periods. Hence,
we can observe an attenuation effect. An attenuation effect can also be observed for
GDP. The longer the delay, the less pronounced is the increase in GDP when a project
is actually realized.
Figure 5: Announcement Shock of an Increase of Productive Government Spending:
n = 0 (solid lines), n = 2 (dashed lines) and n = 4 (dotted lines)
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C The Effects of Sticky Prices
In this section, we analyze a version of the model that incorporates sticky prices. The
modeling of sticky prices follows the formalism proposed by Calvo (1983) and explained
in detail in e.g. Gali (2008). In this environment, there is a continuum of firms of
measure 1 that produce intermediate products. Firm i produces mt(i) in sector M and
st(i) in sector S. A bundler firm puts the intermediate products together in order to
provide the final good that can be used for consumption and investment. In each period,
an individual firm can reset its price with probability 1− µ. When a firm can optimize
its output price, it will take into account that it may not be able to repotimize this price
in the future. Each firm maximizes the present value of profits weighting future profits
by the probability that the price chosen now still applies in the future. Following this,
each firm in sector M and sector S will then choose their optimal prices pmot and p
so
t by
solving the following maximization problems:
max
pmot
∞∑
t=0
βtµtEt {pmot mt(i)−mcmt mt(i)}
subject to
mt(i) =
(
pmot
pmt
)−υ
mt
and
max
psot
∞∑
t=0
βtµtEt {psot st(i)−mcstst(i)}
subject to
st(i) =
(
psot
pst
)−υ
st
The optimal prices are then given by:
pmot =
υ
υ − 1
mcm0 m0(p
m
0 )
υ +
∑∞
t=1 µ
tβtmtmc
m
t (p
m
t )
υ
m0(pm0 )
υ +
∑∞
t=1 µ
tβtmt(pmt )
υ
psot =
υ
υ − 1
mcs0s0(p
s
0)
υ +
∑∞
t=1 µ
tβtstmc
s
t (p
s
t )
υ
s0(ps0)
υ +
∑∞
t=1 µ
tβtst(pst )
υ
These two expression can be written in recursive forms that can then be embedded into
our DSGE model. For sector M , we have:
xmt = mt(p
m
t )
υmcmt + βµx
m
t+1
ymt = mt(p
m
t )
υ + βµymt+1
pmot =
υ
υ − 1
xmt
ymt
where xmt and y
m
t are two auxiliary variables. Similary, we have for sector S:
xst = st(p
s
t )
υmcst + βµx
s
t+1
yst = st(p
s
t )
υ + βµyst+1
psot =
υ
υ − 1
xst
yst
Every firm that can choose an optimal price in period t chooses the same optimal price.
Hence, the aggregate price indices evolve as follows:
pmt =
(
µ(pmt−1)
1−υ + (1− µ)(pmot )1−υ
) 1
1−υ
pst =
(
µ(pst−1)
1−υ + (1− µ)(psot )1−υ
) 1
1−υ
Because of the markup over marginal costs, firms now make aggregate profits
Πmt = p
m
t mt − wmt lmt − rmt kmt
and
Πst = p
s
tst − wst lst − rstkst ,
which are equally distributed among the individuals. Adding these profit shares to the
budget constraint for an individual gives:
(wmt l
m
t + w
s
t l
s
t ) + (r
m
t k
m
t + r
s
tk
s
t ) + (1 + r
d
t−1)dt−1 + Π
m
t + Π
s
t =
pctct + p
im
t imt + p
is
t ist + dt + p
c
t
κ
2
((
kmt+1 − kmt
)2
+
(
kst+1 − kst
)2)
+ tt (26)
We have used two new parameters in this extension of the model, which need to be
calibrated. For υ, we choose a value of 10 which is within the range of values usually
used for this parameter. For µ, we consider three different cases that are depicted in
figures 6: one where µ = 0.25 (solid lines), one case with µ = 0.50 (dashed lines) and
one case with µ = 0.75 (dotted lines).
The attenuation effect of sticky prices on the consumer price index (see figure 6) leads to
a less pronounced impact on the real exchange rate and the terms of trade. Sticky prices
in the tradable goods sector M prevent a strong immediate decrease of output prices in
this sector. In all cases, foreign demand drives prices up and leads to a more negative
impact on private consumption.
Figure 6: Shock to Productive Government Spending under Sticky Prices: µ = 0.25
(solid lines); µ = 0.5 (dashed lines); µ = 0.75 (dotted lines)
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